There are two basic variables here, which correspond to
production and purchase: investment and demand. One driver of growth is investment
in new productive facilities or more productive technologies. The distinction must
be made between productive investment and other vernacular uses of the word
investment: not “investment” in a house or a car, which is a form of
consumption, and not investment in financial assets if these are actually part
of a speculative bubble. Speculative investment produces the appearance of
growth, but not the reality.
Investment can be undertaken by the government or by private
business. If the government does it, investment is funded out of taxes or other
revenue; if business, it’s funded by profits. But both government revenue and
profits are routinely devoted to unproductive ends, like military spending,
healthcare, luxury consumption, or pyramid schemes. Some non-productive
spending is socially desirable and some is not. That distinction doesn’t matter
to capitalism as a system or to economic growth. What does matter is whether government
revenues and profits are invested in expanding production or not.
The other side of the equation is demand. Expanded
production will not contribute to economic growth if the products can’t find a
market, so the other possibility for increasing growth is to increase demand.
This can be done either by convincing people who already have money to spend
more of it, or by increasing the incomes of people whose existing demand is
blocked by inadequate income. The former method relies on innovation: new
product lines like the iPhone, new kinds of advertising to instill desires that
did not exist before, new technologies so that producers will purchase new
equipment. Increasing incomes is a more difficult proposition. It can be
achieved either through the redistribution of existing incomes (but will only increase
growth if those who on average lose income would not have spent as much of it
as those who gain) or by redistributing a part of revenues from producers to
consumers (but this will only increase growth if it does not cripple the
all-important productive investment that producers might otherwise have
pursued).
A final possibility for increasing growth in addition to
strengthening investment (expanding value) and demand (realizing value) is to
increase the efficiency of the circulation of value. This can be done by making
it easier to move goods around (container shipping has been a huge advance in
recent decades) or by improving methods of communication to make economic
coordination more efficient. As the movement of value increases in speed, part
of it is freed for reinvestment in new production, which can indirectly increase
growth. But if this newly freed value is not invested productively, if instead
it is put to strictly speculative uses, then real economic growth will not
follow.
The complex tradeoffs in pursuing these approaches should
already be apparent. For example, one way to increase demand is to divert money from profits
to workers’ consumption (either individually by raising wages or through the
government by increasing taxes on business and then spending the revenue on
social programs). But this will reduce the funds available for productive
investment. To avoid this kind of conflict, a careful analysis of the imbalances and dysfunctions of the
economy is necessary to settle on measures that don't simply cancel out their growth effects.
Growth has stagnated in the United States, Japan, and Europe,
and the eurozone crisis threatens to turn stagnation into collapse. Growth in
China, India, Brasil, Turkey, Indonesia, and other “emerging markets” is
proceeding for the moment, but there is a very real possibility that a large
part of this growth is founded in speculative bubbles and vulnerable to abrupt
deflation. Moreover, because these economies rely on exports to the rich
countries, any further slowdown in the US, Europe, and Japan could cripple growth
elsewhere. It seems clear that beneath the everyday distractions of bond market fluctuations and deficit deals, the paralysis of the growth process is what structures this crisis.
One additional method of renewing growth should
be mentioned, because historically it has been both effective and common. If you destroy
massive amounts of existing value, then both investment and demand can be
restored through the process of rebuilding from the devastation. There are many
forms that the wholesale destruction of value has taken, all of them
catastrophic: inflation, deflation, war. If the current impasse is not broken
in some other way, this is the prospect we face.
Apropos of the last point, Roger Cohen goes for gallows humor and blunders into some real insight:
ReplyDelete"Still, folks, there’s hope out there. Japan, whose economy went dead for a decade, is enjoying a spurt. All it took was a tsunami to notch up a quarter of growth. Perhaps what Europe and the United States need is a major natural disaster — it would make a change from the man-made ones — or a good little war."